1
For, since anger is a passion, it is in the sensitive appetite.
2
Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to our command.
3
Therefore the will cannot be moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite.
4
Therefore passion is more consistent with the intellectual than with the sensitive appetite.
5
Or we may say that he is defining delight of the sensitive appetite.
6
Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to man's command.
7
Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not only in the sensitive appetite.
8
Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot be the subject of virtue.
9
Moral habits induce acts of will and sensitive appetite: intellectual habits, acts of intellect.
10
But to lust is an act of the sensitive appetite.
11
Therefore there is no sensitive appetite differing from the concupiscible.
12
But the sensitive appetite can have no tendency to wisdom.
13
Objection 1: It would seem that the act of the sensitive appetite is not commanded.
14
Objection 1: It would seem that the will cannot be moved by the sensitive appetite.
15
Therefore concupiscence is not only in the sensitive appetite.
16
Because the sensitive appetite is subject to the reason, not immediately but through the will.
